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Andrew Young School houses seven leading research centers and policy programs, including 
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sustainable economic growth in developing and transitional economies. 
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recognized worldwide for its efforts in support of economic and public policy reforms through 
technical assistance and training around the world. This reputation has been built serving a 
diverse client base, including the World Bank, the U.S. Agency for International Development 
(USAID), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), finance ministries, government 
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For more information about our technical assistance activities and training programs, please 
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We test the link between labor market rigidities and job performance in the public sector using a novel 
outcome variable namely, the number of days that it takes to the postal service to return letters sent to non-
existent foreign addresses, a measure that we argue is an excellent proxy for job performance. We find a 
positive and statistically significant link between these two variables, regardless of the labor rigidity 
measure employed, changes in specification, and even unlikely endogeneity considerations, which suggest 
that this finding may be causal. 
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Economic research provides plenty of evidence that indicates that excessive labor market rigidities 
will compromise efficiency by not allowing an economy to optimally allocate resources among sectors of 
the economy. This is so because, as it has been typically argued, rigidities distort incentives of economic 
agents, which translates in reduced economic performance. While this view is not particularly controversial 
in economics, evidence on the the extent to which performance changes due to labor market rigidities has 
proved difficult to measure, as accurate outcome variables that gauge job performance have proved 
particularly difficult to come by. 
We provide evidence on the link between labor market rigidities and job performance in the public 
sector by using a novel outcome variable, namely, the time it takes for the national postal service to return 
letters to a foreign sender when such letters were sent to non-existent addresses. In fact, as required by 
postal conventions, countries must return an undeliverable letter to the country of origin for otherwise they 
would be violating an international agreement. In addition this agreement also contemplates the fact that 
the cost of returning any undeliverable letters is paid by the sending country and not the receiving one. In 
the context above, the use of this outcome variable is particularly useful for our purposes for several reasons. 
In particular, it truly measures performance as it only requires that workers perform their duties, in this 
case, the very simple task of, essentially, placing a wrongly sent letter to a “return bin” and make sure that 
the letters are sent for delivery back to the sender country. This simple task requires little-to-no education, 
very little manual or intellectual effort when the cost of returning the letter is borne by the sender. In short, 
this variable simply measures whether workers do their job. In addition, we believe that this outcome 
variable is rather relevant to measure performance in the public sector for despite the growth of online and 
private delivery services, the demand for postal services has, if anything, grown over time worldwide and, 
in fact, the postal service still delivers over 200 letters per person per year in industrial countries and remains 
among the largest employers in most countries around the world (Chong, et al, 2014).  
Our paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data and methodology. Section 3 presents 
our results, including the use of alternative measures of labor rigidity, the application of sensitivity analysis 
to changes in specification, and endogeneity correction using instrumental variables. Finally, Section 4 
concludes. 
2. Data and Methodology 
The dependent variable, collected by Chong, et al (2014), measures the return time in days of letters 
that were sent to nonexistent business addresses in 159 foreign countries. The letters were fully 
standardized, sent via airmail to each of the five largest cities in 159 countries using correct international 
postage. Two letters were sent to each city chosen. Each letter contained the same return address with the 
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following phrase in large, bold letters in each envelope: “please, return to sender if undeliverable”. The 
letters were dropped in street mailboxes in Cambridge, MA between 8 December 2010 and 4 February 2011 
(Chong, et al, 2014). Our key labor market rigidity measure is an index that comes from Campos and Nugent 
(2012) and was based on previous research that systematizes specific rigidity legislation using the 
methodology described in Botero, et al (2004). In addition, we employ a series of control variables, most 
of which were obtained from World Development Indicators (WDI) from the World Bank, with the 
exception of colonial heritage (Hensel, 2014) and perception of corruption (Transparency International, 
2016). Table 1 presents variable definitions and corresponding sources. Table 2 shows summary statistics. 
We use the following reduced form: 
 
𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑘 = 𝛼𝐿𝐴𝑀𝑅𝐼𝐺𝑖 + 𝛽𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖 + 𝛾𝐶𝑃𝐼𝑖 + 𝛿𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖 + 𝜃𝑆𝑒𝑐. 𝐸𝑛𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑖 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜌𝑖 + 𝑖𝑘 
 
Where (i) Return Time denotes the number of days the letter 𝑘 in country 𝑖 took to be sent back1, (ii) 
LAMRIG is the rigidity of employment legislation, (iii) GDP denotes the logarithm of the gross domestic 
product per capita, (iv) CPI represents a corruption perception Index, (v) Growth denotes the rate of growth 
and (vi) Sec.Enrol denotes the school enrollment. In addition, 𝜇𝑖  and 𝜌𝑖 represent country and year fixed 
effects, and the last variable is the error term. The data for all the explanatory variables employ averages 
for 2008 and 2009. The exception is our labor rigidity data, which is based on information that employs 
averages from 2000 to 20042.  In addition, all regressions are clustered at the country level.  Finally, while 
highly unlikely, we also pursue an instrumental variables using colonial heritage as a reasonable instrument 
for our labor market rigidity index.  
3. Findings 
Table 3 presents our main findings. We find that the labor rigidity coefficient is positively linked 
to return days and is statistically significant at one percent in our preferred specification (Column 4). Thus, 
the higher degree of rigidity in the labor market the worse the performance of workers. This may occur as 
a result of moral hazard as jobs are secure and the likelihood of a worker being penalized or fired is reduced 
drastically in rigid labor markets. Whereas endogeneity may not be a matter of particular concern given 
that (i) it is unreasonable to expect that return time will affect rigidity levels and (ii) all the regressions 
include country fixed and year effects, we still apply a two-stages approach in order to deal with this 
                                                          
1 We follow Chong, et al (2014) and use a cut-off of 423 days for the letters that were not sent back, which is when 
they stopped collecting data. 
2 Institutional data move rather slowly and as such, it is reasonable to assume that this difference in period does not 
pose a problem as several other researchers have also argue (e.g, Botero, et al, 2004) 





potential issue, in particular, from an omitted variables perspective. We use colonial heritage (Hensel, 2014) 
as instrument as this variable is strongly correlated with our potential endogenous variable, labor market 
rigidity (Botero, et al, 2014), but it is not apparent that it may be directly linked with the return time of the 
letters, as required.  In Table 3, Column 5 we find supporting evidence that our findings may be causal, 
which are also consistent with the reported F-test of excluded instruments3. 
In Table 4 we show robustness tests by employing alternative rigidity measures. In particular we 
use labor rigidity measures related to the cost of firing, dismissal, and severance payments in countries4. 
Our results are all very similar to our key finding and all are statistical at one percent as well. 
Finally, in Table 5 we test whether our findings are robust to changes in specification (Sala-i-
Martín, 1997). To do this, we augment our benchmark specification using combinations of two variables 
out of a pool of ten ancillary variables5. The variable of interest is robust with the dependent variables if 
the weighted cdf(0) is greater than or equal to or higher than 0.90, which is what we find for all our labor 
market rigidity measures. In fact, we find analogous results when using the instrumental variables case. 
4. Conclusions  
We test the link between labor market rigidities and job performance in the public sector using a 
novel outcome variable namely, the number of days that it takes to the postal service of a country to return 
letters sent to non-existent foreign addresses, a measure that we argue is an excellent proxy for job 
performance. We find a positive and statistically significant link between these two variables, regardless of 
the labor rigidity measure employed, changes in specification, and even unlikely endogeneity 
considerations, which suggests that this finding may be causal namely, from labor rigidity to reduced job 
performance by workers. 
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Table 1: Variable Definitions 
Variable  Definition  
Days to Return Number of days between the date the letter was sent and returned between 
December 2010 and February 2011. Unreturned letters were assigned 423 days, an 
arbitrary cutoff number chose by authors Source: Chong et al. (2014) 
LAMRIG Index  Rigidity of employment legislation Index 2000 – 2004 using methodology of 
Botero, et al. (2004). Higher index indicates more rigidity. Source: Campos and 
Nugent (2012) 
Colonial Heritage  Dummy variable equals to one if the country was once a colony, otherwise equals 
to zero. Source: ICOW Colonial Data  
Ln GDP per capita  Average 2008 and 2009 of Ln GDP per capita (constant 2010 US$). Source: World 
Development Indicators 
Corruption Average 2008 and 2009 of Inverse of Corruption Perception Index. The score 
indicates the perceived level of public sector corruption on a scale of 0 (highly 
corrupt) to 10 (very clean). Source: Transparency International  
Growth GDP Average 2008 and 2009 of GDP growth (annual %). Source: WDI. 
Secondary Enrolment Average 2008 and 2009 of School enrollment, secondary (% gross). Source: World 
Bank 
Cost of Firing  Average 2008 and 2009 Cost of Firing in days: Notice cost + Severance cost + 
Penalty cost. Source: World Bank. 
Dismissal Procedure Average 2008 and 2009. Average of dummies: notify before dismiss, approval 
before dismiss, notify before collective dismiss, approval before collective 
dismiss, retraining before worker redundant, priority rules to redundancy 
dismissal, priority rules to re-employment).  Source: World Bank 
Severance after 20 years  Average 2008 and 2009 of Severance pay for redundancy dismissal after 20 years 
of employment. Source: World Bank 
 
  





Table 2: Summary Statistics 
Variable  Mean Std. Dev. Min Max  
Days to Return 228.22 166.91 6.00 423 
LAMRIG Index  158.55 44.75 45.71 245 
Ln GDP per capita  8.50 1.54 5.37 11.55 
Corruption Perception -4.03 2.17 -9.35 0 
Growth GDP 2.11 3.99 -10.07 14.81 
Secondary Enrolment 79.76 27.37 11.56 129.18 
Cost of Firing  50.35 55.87 0 446.33 
Dismissal Procedure 0.38 0.29 0 1 
Severance after 20 years  42.93 55.56 0 433.33 
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Table 3: Main Results  
Dependent Variable: Days to Return  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
LAMRIG Index  2.542*** 0.410*** 0.498*** 1.121*** 0.819** 
 
(0.058) (0.028) (0.013) (0.190) (0.392) 
Ln GDP per capita  -180.8*** -3.808*** -4.997*** -17.41*** 4.304 
 
(6.411) (0.693) (0.495) (3.672) (7.441) 
Corruption 
 
-63.919*** -54.362*** -24.472*** -14.522*** 
  
(2.566) (0.972) (5.755) (4.162) 
Growth GDP pc 
  
-0.768*** -3.910*** -5.439*** 
   
(0.128) (0.152) (1.800) 
Secondary Enrolment 
   
-0.400*** -1.762*** 
    
(0.148) (0.302) 
Constant 1276.529*** 456.471*** 432.830*** 361.154*** 226.268*** 
 
(38.832) (5.915) (1.974) (31.873) (80.312) 
F-test of excluded instruments 
    
61.36 
Test of endogeneity (p value) 
    
0.079 
R-squared 0.517 0.517 0.517 0.515  
Adjusted R-squared 0.463 0.463 0.463 0.461  
Observations 1350 1350 1350 990 980 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. Columns 1-5 employ ordinary least squares as well as 
country and year fixed effects and standard errors clustered at the city level. Column 6 applies an instrumental variable approach 
with colonial heritage as the instrument. 
  





Table 4: Robustness to Changes in Rigidity Measures  
 
Days to Return (1) (2) (3) 
Cost of Firing  0.712***   
 (0.104)   
Dismissal Procedure  106.799***  
  (15.628)  
Severance after 20 years  
  
0.503***    
(0.074) 
Ln GDP per capita  -4.498*** -4.819*** -15.076***  
(1.276) (1.229) (0.272) 
Corruption -52.271*** -37.575*** -48.285***  
(0.959) (1.191) (0.376) 
Growth GDP -5.262*** -0.777 -6.143***  
(0.115) (0.542) (0.243) 
Secondary Enrolment -1.029*** -0.744*** -0.956***  
(0.018) (0.023) (0.007) 
Constant 559.141*** 433.543*** 635.428***  
(7.544) (25.922) (3.619) 
R-squared 0.52 0.52 0.52 
Adjusted R-squared 0.47 0.47 0.47 
Observations 1060 1060 1060 
Standard errors in parentheses; * p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. Regressions 
include country and year fixed effects and standard errors clustered at the city level. 
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Table 5: Sensitivity to Changes in Specification 
 Cumulative 
Distribution 





LAMRIG index 1.332 0.104 0.96 
Cost of Firing 0.892 0.09 0.94 
Dismissal Procedure 102.46 15.23 0.90 
Severance after 20 years 0.635 0.08 0.93 
Following Sala-i-Martin (1997) a variable whose weighted cdf(0) is larger than 0.90 is significantly 
correlated with the dependent variable (i.e. robust) at a ten percent significance level. The cdf is computed 
assuming non-normality of the parameters estimated. Results are similar if we assume normality, instead. 
We use our preferred specification shown in Table 3, Column 4.  Results are analogous for the 
instrumental variables case. 
 
  





Appendix: First Stage  
(Instrumental Variables, Table 3, Column 5)   
Colonial Heritage  31.257***  
(3.990) 
Ln GDP per capita  0.998  
(2.530) 
Corruption -7.992***  
(1.103) 
Growth GDP pc -2.095***  
(0.405) 
Secondary Enrolment -0.066  
(0.087) 





Standard errors in parentheses; * p<0.10, **p<0.05, 
***p<0.01. Regressions include country and year fixed 
effects and standard errors clustered at the city level. 
 
 
 
 
